本研究通过两个实验分别在恰好和超额经济补偿条件下比较了道歉和经济补偿对高、低权力受害方信任修复的影响。实验首先通过角色分配法操纵被试(信任方)的权力感(高、低)，然后要求其与受托方完成一定轮次的信任博弈，并且设置受托方在关键的轮次实施信任违背行为(不返还金钱)和信任修复行为(控制条件、道歉、经济补偿、道歉加补偿)，最后测量高、低权力受害方在信任修复行为后的投资金额。结果发现：(1)在恰好补偿条件下，道歉对低权力受害方的信任修复效果更好，经济补偿对高权力受害方的信任修复效果更好；(2)在超额补偿条件下，无论对于高权力还是低权力受害方，经济补偿都比道歉的信任修复效果更好。

This study conducted two experiments to examine whether the effectiveness of repair strategies (financial compensations vs. apologies) was moderated by the victim’s social hierarchy. Power was manipulated by varying the availability of alternatives during a trust game, and all participants were assigned as trustors. The participants were required to complete a certain round of trust game with the trustee, followed by an action by the trustee who broke that trust (did not return money). Subsequently, the offender offered different trust repair strategies after a trust violation (control, apologies, exact financial compensations, and apologies plus exact financial compensations). Finally, the investment amounts of high- and low-power victims were measured after the trust repair behavior. These results showed that when the financial compensation provided by the offender just made up for the victim’s economic loss, financial compensations were more effective than apologies in repairing trust for high-power victims, and apologies were more effective than financial compensations for low-power victims. However, when the financial compensation provided by the offender exceeded the economic loss of the victim, for both high-power and low-power victims, financial compensations were more effective than apologies on trust repair.