信息表征形式对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响

心理与行为研究 ›› 2005, Vol. 3 ›› Issue (2): 109-115.

信息表征形式对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响

傅小兰, 赵晓东

脑与认知科学国家重点实验室,中国科学院心理研究所,北京 100101

收稿日期:2005-02-05 出版日期:2005-06-20 发布日期:2015-01-21
作者简介:傅小兰,女,中国科学院心理研究所研究员,博士生导师。Email: fuxl@psych.ac.cn。
基金资助:
本研究得到中国科技部9732002CB312103项目、国家自然科学基金60433030重点项目和面上项目30270466、中国科学院心理研究所创新0302037重点项目的资助

EFFECTS OF INFORMATION REPRESENTATION ON BAYESIAN REASONING

Fu Xiaolan,Zhao Xiaodong

State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101

Received:2005-02-05 Online:2005-06-20 Published:2015-01-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过三个实验分别考察问题形式（一步问题,两步问题）、信息结构（分割结构,未分割结构）和辅助图形表征（条形图、饼图、结构图）对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响。研究结果表明：(1)一步问题形式有时优于两步问题形式;(2)频率格式提问有时优于几率格式提问;(3)分割的信息结构明显优于未分割的信息结构;(4)与条形图和饼图形式的图形辅助表征相比,结构图形式的图形辅助表征显著提高了被试解决贝叶斯推理问题的成绩。

关键词: 贝叶斯推理, 信息表征, 问题形式, 信息结构, 辅助图形

Abstract: Three experiments were conducted to explore the effects of question form, information structure, and assistant figure on the Bayesian inference. The results showed:(a)One-step form might be better than two-step form,(b)frequency format was better than chance format,(c)information structure with subset relations were better than without subset relations, and(d)structured diagram was much helpful. A question based on subset relations with frequency format, one-step form, and structured diagram could be solved by above 77% Chinese undergraduates.

Key words: Bayesian reasoning, information representation, question form, information structure, assistant figure

中图分类号:

B842.5

傅小兰, 赵晓东. 信息表征形式对解决贝叶斯推理问题的影响[J]. 心理与行为研究, 2005, 3(2): 109-115.

Fu Xiaolan,Zhao Xiaodong. EFFECTS OF INFORMATION REPRESENTATION ON BAYESIAN REASONING[J]. Studies of Psychology and Behavior, 2005, 3(2): 109-115.

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